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ABSTRACT

Europe is in crisis. Millions of its citizens are living in poverty and subject to sustained programmes of austerity that are widening the gap between rich and poor. Communicative possibilities are squeezed by the realities of media market behaviour: public service broadcasters are facing challenges of legitimacy and funding while established news outlets are increasingly distrusted by audiences; Despite the scale of the crisis, however, there appears to be little appetite amongst media researchers to develop a professional or policy response that rises to the challenge and attempts to offer necessary solutions. This article reflects on existing policy norms and suggests that we need fresh ones that better articulate how best to respond to neoliberalisation and both communicative and economic crisis. Rhetorical commitments to democracy, free speech, privacy and transparency are being squeezed by a more pragmatic emphasis on efficiency and competition leaving little room for more expansive ambitions of social justice and equality. By focusing on several case studies, the article argues that we need more radical policy frames to confront the serious attacks we are facing on the public media and the public interest more generally.
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Media Policy Norms for a Europe in Crisis

INTRODUCTION

This article calls for media policy researchers to raise their game in the context of a serious crisis affecting social provision and public communication across Europe. It is an argument for researchers to see themselves as activists without in any way compromising their academic integrity or scholarship. Why should we do this and are we already doing this? Is media policy activism the most appropriate way to secure progressive gains? Is it possible to pursue media activism without sacrificing our scholarly credentials? These are all entirely legitimate questions but I believe that the stakes are high enough to at least to start to examine seriously the roles and objectives of policy scholars more generally.
What I want to do in this article is to briefly outline the contexts of both the social and communications crisis that we are facing and then to suggest some policy norms that better respond to entrenched neoliberalisation, an associated attack on public provision and increasing lack of trust in major public institutions. Existing normative commitments to objectives like pluralism, free speech, public service and transparency have, in my view, been compromised by those who continue to use these terms at the same time as vigorously pursuing approaches that I see as taking them in a different direction: maximising shareholder over public value, striving for efficiencies and bowing down to vested interests – whether those of the state or business. 
I realise that I may be dangerously close to blurring the boundaries between scholarly analysis and policy advocacy and, like many critics of neoliberalism, I may be accused of essentialising the market as some sort of negative panacea while fetishising the role of the state and regulation. This is only partially true. I support regulation when it has demonstrable benefits for the public and I oppose the state when it tramples on the rights and freedoms of ordinary people (which is all too often). The crucial point, however, is that neoliberalism has radically altered the relationship between state and market so that social life is now increasingly governed by a market logic and dominated by unaccountable institutions and processes without the necessary public oversight (Mirowski 2013). In this context, it makes sense to assume both an academic and an advocacy role given that they complement each other: evidence and analysis from scholarly research informs my activism which in turn generates many of the questions that I as an academic want to pursue. And, as a media policy researcher, these questions are focused on how best to correct the tremendous inequality in the distribution of media resources – or what you could otherwise simply call media power (Freedman 2014).

THE CONTEXT OF CRISIS

These are hard times in Europe with 12 quarters of GDP negative growth since the 2008 crash and total GDP only now surpassing the 2008 figure. But the key is that not everyone has shared the burden of austerity equally. Figures from Caritas (Caritas 2015), the Catholic relief agency, show a pretty terrible picture of poverty in Europe. There are some 122 million people estimated to be living in poverty including 28 per cent of children (ibid, 16); we have 24 million people unemployed with youth unemployment rates of 58.3 per cent in Greece, 55.5 per cent in Spain and 40 per cent in Italy accompanied by general unemployment of 27.3 per cent in Greece and 26.1 per cent in Spain (ibid, 54). There have been serious cuts to services affecting health, welfare, education and social cohesion that disproportionately affect the poorest households, specifically those with children. 
The key point here I want to make is that wealth has been extremely unevenly distributed and that the burden of austerity has fallen on the poorest. What are some of the consequences of continuing austerity both for populations in general and for media policy and pluralism more generally?
The first conclusion we can draw is that the European project itself has been tainted. Last year’s Eurobarometer poll revealed that those for whom the European Union (EU) conjures up a positive image has fallen from 48 per cent just before the crisis broke to just 35 per cent last year (European Commission 2014, 6). Trust in the EU has fallen from 50 per cent in 2008 to 31 per cent in 2014 (ibid, 9). Of course, opinion, as well as wealth, is highly unevenly distributed and you find that, for example, the Maltese as well as the Finns are highly optimistic about the future of the EU while the British and, perhaps not surprisingly, the Greeks, are far more pessimistic (ibid, 11). There is also a huge disparity in figures about how citizens judge the state of the economy: from 14 per cent negative in Germany to 96 per cent in Portugal, Greece and Spain. But the fact remains that positive views on the economy outweigh negative views in only 7 out of 29 countries (ibid, 16). This is not a Europe characterized by optimism, equality and a shared sense of responsibility.
This maps onto figures showing the lack of trust in many public institutions. Trust in national governments and parliaments is actually below that of the EU itself while trust in media – institutions which may be expected to hold powerful bodies to account and to represent the views of ordinary people – remains low. Only 49 per cent tend to trust TV, 40 per cent the written press and, bottom of the list, 34 per cent the internet (European Commission 2013, 18) although 15-24 year olds are substantially more trusting of the internet than their older peers. The poll shows that the vast majority of Europeans do not feel well-informed about European matters (ibid, 33) and that the poorest, defined as those who face the hardest time paying their bills, are most likely to distrust the media (ibid, 19). Trust in the media is related to many issues but it most certainly related to class. In Britain, only 22 per cent of the population trust journalists to tell the truth in contrast to the 90 per cent who trust to tell the truth (Ipsos MORI 2015).
Lack of trust in key public institution can also be connected to issues concerning media performance and the achievement, or not, of the critical role that news media are supposed to play in equipping citizens with the knowledge to make sense of and to intervene in social situations (Curran 2002). For example, to what extent can we trace a connection between the fact that only 35 per cent of Irish citizens trust the Irish press and the fact that the latter have been such passionate champions of austerity? A recent book analysing media coverage of the economic crisis concludes that “[t]he Irish media have been overwhelmingly supportive of the strategy [of austerity]. Indeed only 11 per cent of the nearly 1,000 opinion pieces examined…did not support fiscal consolidation. The media have thus fully accepted the principle of austerity, and debate has revolved around how best to implement it” (Mercille 2015, 111). In an earlier journal article, the same author Julien Mercille notes that “[o]ne reason for the weakness of positions opposed to fiscal consolidation is that they have tended to be limited to disagreements with specific cuts rather than questioning fiscal consolidation in principle” (Mercille 2014, 297). This echoes the findings of a recent collection by leading economic commentators that investigates the failure of the media around the world to play a proactive or investigatory role in the run up to the financial crisis. It places “the failure of investigative journalism at the heart of the problem’ and notes that the UK press, for example, coalesced “around an acceptance of austerity” (Schifferes and Roberts 2015, xvii).
The second consequence is that we are simultaneously seeing the reshaping of the European communications environment with the entrenchment of a market logic and the diminution both of public institutions and public accountability. For example, a recent report on the transparency of media ownership in Europe found that in most countries surveyed, “company law reporting obligations are insufficient to provide a detailed picture of the ownership and influences behind media companies” (Access Info Europe 2013: 1) – information that is essential to confront abuses of media power. We have also seen worrying levels of concentrated ownership as evidenced by the recent report of the EC-sponsored Media Pluralism Monitor that assessed media freedom in nine sample countries. “By monitoring the risks of high ownership concentration in the media, high concentration of cross-media ownership, and lack of transparency in ownership structures, indicators assess a medium to high-risk results in all of the 9 countries” (Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom 2014, 4). In the UK, a supposedly highly competitive marketplace, three companies account for 70 per cent of national newspaper circulation, five companies dominate 70 per cent of regional circulation, one company dominates pay TV and one wholesaler dominates commercial radio news (Media Reform Coalition 2014).
Let us focus now on just one example of the transformation of this landscape: the increasing polarisation between private operators and public service media (PSM) across Europe. The top five private companies (Liberty, BSkyB, RTL, Mediaset and Canal+) have same revenue (€33 billion) as the 57 members of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU 2014a, 15). While many EBU Members are experiencing severe economic difficulties, the top 12 European commercial media groups continue to see growth in their revenues: in 2013, their total revenue increased by 4.8 per cent while revenue for PSM operators dropped by 4 per cent. Income for the top 12 commercial media groups in Europe is now more than 50 per cent greater than PSM income and what is revealing is that this gap has nearly doubled in the last five years (ibid, 17): in 2008, just before the crash, it was 27.6 per cent while in 2013, commercial broadcasters earned more than 51.4 per cent more than their PSM counterparts (ibid, 17). While PSM revenue declined by 8.7 per cent between 2008-13, its commercial counterparts saw their revenue grow by the same amount (ibid, 18). In the five major European markets listed in the EBU research, the largest commercial operators all have more revenue that total PSM revenue (ibid, 20). According to the author of the EBU report, Roberto Suarez, “there’s no doubt that PSM are not a threat to a healthy market, free competition and the development of commercial initiatives” (EBU 2014b). 
Yet this is rarely the story that is told and, at least in the UK, it is not the one that appears to be driving policy where commercial lobbyists remain determined to scale back the operations of public service operators. For example, when, in 2013, the government announced a consultation on measuring media ownership, at least partly in response to Lord Justice Leveson’s recommendation to address the power of news proprietors that were identified following the phone hacking crisis, the Daily Mail reacted by arguing that “the BBC could be curbed under government plans to remain dominance of media giants” while the Sun described the review simply as a “Probe into BBC share of news coverage” (Freedman 2013).
This is the tone adopted in the government’s Green Paper on the future of the BBC (Department for Culture, Media and Sport 2015) which has shaped the agenda for public discussion of the Corporation’s charter review that is due to completed by the end of 2016. Culture secretary John Whittingdale insists that he is “committed both to the future of the BBC and to its underlying Reithian mission” (ibid, 3) but then, in the very next paragraph, goes on to question the relevance in a digital age of the principle of “universality”, one of the foundational principles of Reithian public service broadcasting. Instead of encouraging the BBC to reach out across all platforms and to serve all audiences, the starting point of the Green Paper is that the BBC’s very success is now its problem.
Indeed, scale, not independence, accuracy or quality, becomes the key issue. The BBC, it suggests, should focus not on popularity but marginality – on “underserved audiences” (Department for Culture, Media and Sport 2015, 3), in other words, those affected by “market failure”. In reality, this means that the BBC should relate only to audiences and genres that commercial broadcasters deem to be unprofitable and so leave the latter to gobble up large audiences while leaving the crumbs to the Corporation.
The Green Paper goes out of its way to suggest that the BBC is the dominant player in all the “markets” in which it operates, without acknowledging firstly that it is, at least hypothetically, subject to public scrutiny unlike its commercial counterparts and secondly that it is not, in fact, the UK’s largest broadcaster – a position that is occupied by Sky that has 50 per cent more revenue than the BBC. The government claims to support the BBC’s current mission but also states that “changes to the purposes, scale and scope may be required to ensure that this does not result in an overly extended BBC” (ibid, 2015, 16). For this reason, the document appears to be obsessed by the BBC’s “impact on the market” (ibid, 28) and manages to list more negative than positive consequences arising from the fact that the BBC reaches some 96 per cent of the UK population each week. For example, the document grudgingly acknowledges that the BBC’s size and spend “can result in positive effects for the creative industries” (ibid, 25), a phrase that rather downplays the Corporation’s contribution to the wider creative economy, an amount estimated by the BBC itself to be approximately £8 billion (Heath 2015). But the Green Paper then counters this with five ways in which the Corporation may eat into the activities of its commercial rivals. So when it argues that “the scale of BBC’s online offer is impeding the ability of other UK news outlets to develop profitable business models” (Department for Culture, Media and Sport 2015, 25), it ignores the fact that the BBC was encouraged in the late 1990s to innovate and to build digital platforms at a time when the vast majority of the press had no inclination to take the risk of investing in online services.
There is, of course, a more profound question. Why should we measure the BBC simply in terms of its wider impact on the marketplace? Do we judge public health provision on the basis of whether it makes life difficult for private health providers or do we welcome the fact that public institutions are designed to treat everyone irrespective of background or income? Do we want to curb public investment in schools in case this hits the pockets of the private sector and “crowds out” commercial competition?
Public provision has been affected in a range of ways in such a challenging political and economic environment – from the abrupt closure of the Greek broadcaster ERT in June 2013 “under the pretence of austerity” (Sarikakis 2014) to the BBC’s rather more tactical reaction to budgetary constraints which has consisted of the Corporation embracing self-discipline and efficiency with almost messianic fervour. Lumbered with a frozen licence fee and additional responsibilities in its 2010 settlement with government – cuts that the BBC now say amount to a 26 per cent real-terms reduction (BBC 2014, 15) – the Corporation embarked on a huge programme of cost-cutting that has delivered annual savings of £1.1 billion through “property rationalisation, procurement savings, reducing the costs of our people and a wide range of other initiatives in every part of the BBC” (ibid, 2). Yet the savings are not confined just to people, processes and buildings but to programmes and channels. As part of the BBC’s “Delivering Quality First” initiative, the Corporation threatened to shut down at least two national radio stations, 6 Music and the Asian Network, before popular protests forced them to back down. Now, under yet more pressure following another disastrous licence fee settlement in 2015, the Corporation has confirmed the shift online of the youth-oriented channel BBC3 and further cuts to sports, online news and interactive services (Martinson 2015).
Of course, the BBC has not set but responded to an austerity agenda but it seems to have pursued the cuts with an evangelical fervour that is slightly disturbing. This was best illustrated by the launch of its report into its savings programme, Driving Efficiency at the BBC (BBC 2014), organised in association with the centre-right think tank Reform. It was an event at which the Corporation’s finance director spoke persuasively of the “logic of public value” and the need to rigorously pursue efficiency in order to protect its public service duties. The report articulates a view that public service can be measured more effectively by the ability of organisations to extract maximum value from staff and infrastructure rather than their ability to produce a wide range of high quality programmes and services that are of genuine use to their audiences. 
Now of course, the two are closely interrelated and the BBC continues to produce an impressive variety of output that, as I have already pointed out, reaches the vast majority of the UK adult population every week. However, it is also the case that the “logic of public value” and austerity drives cannot be insulated from programme-making and indeed the wider culture of the BBC. It is surely no coincidence that, at the same time as driving down costs, the BBC was able to find £2 billion to pay six-figure payouts for the pensions of senior executives (Hall 2013). It is also no coincidence that, in its desire to placate Treasury mandarins, government ministers and corporate lobbyists, its robust editorial independence may have come under strain. As one extensive content analysis of BBC coverage concluded, the BBC “tends to reproduce a Conservative, pro-business version of the world, not a left-wing anti-business agenda” (Berry 2013). This follows what Justin Schlosberg has referred to as a “tightening of the editorial reins” and a growing “climate of caution” (Schlosberg 2013, 82) since the Corporation was severely criticised by the Hutton Inquiry in 2003, its last major run-in with government. 
The third consequence concerns what we may call the “evisceration” of the meaning of key policy objectives under the pressure of marketised social relations. We can see this in particular in relation to debates concerning media pluralism and press freedom. Pluralism, the concept used in Europe to denote a sufficient number of outlets that supports a range of diverse voices, is supposed to be a foundational principle that does two things: first, to provide citizens with a full range of information and second to break up undue concentrations of power (Ofcom 2012, 1). But recent policy debates have been dominated by a commitment to secure pluralism that sees it not in terms of the equitable distribution of media power but as related to the promotion of consumer choice: of making the menu a little longer but not really looking at what is on the menu itself. In the UK’s highly concentrated media market, the government has neutralised pluralism policy by rejecting “remedies” in favour of the “need to remain nimble in the face of great change” (Department for Culture, Media & Sport 2014, 23). Pluralism, in its execution if not its definition, is to be presided over by interests that are very distant from the publics to which the policy objective ought to be accountable. There continue to be many eloquent statements about the importance of securing pluralism – and of including digital intermediaries in any solutions identified (for example, High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism 2013) – but Index on Censorship’s Mike Harris is right to argue that media plurality “is one such area where a clear commitment by member states has not been matched by action from either the states themselves, or the European Commission” (Harris 2013).
There is a similar evisceration of the meaning of press freedom whereby the ability of journalists to hold power to account through independent investigation and to secure their citizens’ right to know has been squeezed by a new determination to associate such liberties with the rights of corporations to speak as they wish. “Because liberal theory conflates the freedom of the press with that of media owners”, argues Simon Dawes (2014: 22), “it overlooks the employee rights of journalists and disregards their freedom from the restraint and whims of their employers, and fails to recognise the reality of the incentives and constraints inherent to an environment of market competition that guide journalist behaviour.” Indeed, in the UK, there has, for the last few years, been a fierce—and thus far highly effective— backlash against government proposals for a new Royal Charter on press self-regulation led by newspaper proprietors claiming that they – and their titles – are the only guarantors of press freedom. This is despite the fact that it was their activities—the industrial scale of phone hacking, the privileged access of proprietors to politicians, and the press’ refusal to tolerate any kind of independent audit of its activities (Davies 2014)—that have so massively lowered the credibility of many news organisations in the public’s eyes.
So, to take a fairly typical example, one leading commentator used his column in the Mail on Sunday to insist that the proposed Charter would “bury three centuries of press freedom” (Nelson 2013). Yet the article failed to provide a single example of how an oversight body of a self-regulator with no remit whatsoever to impose restraints on journalists would be able, single-handedly, to tame what its supporters regularly describe as a “raucous” press. Another commentator railed against the “chilling effect” of proposals for independent self-regulation and called as witnesses to her campaign against “illiberal state licensing of newspapers” (Fox 2013) such notables as John Stuart Mill, John Milton and even Karl Marx while totally ignoring the fact that we live in very different historical circumstances from those campaigners for a free press. Today, the most restrictive influence on journalists is generally not the pre-publication censorship of previous eras so much as the commercial imperative to secure exclusives and increase circulation whatever the ethical consequences. Where journalists do face overt state intervention—often concerning security-related issues—many proprietors and editors are suddenly less keen to prioritise “press freedom” over the  “national interest” as demonstrated by the Sun’s accusation that the Guardian newspaper had committed “treason” simply for publishing Edward Snowden’s revelations about the scale of US and UK government surveillance (Liddle 2013). This suggests a real tension between a corporatized notion of press freedom – in which the press are just as “free” to suppress information as they are to circulate it – and a more expansive understanding that privileges both the journalist’s right to report and the citizen’s right to know in the face of elite power. The definition and deployment of key media policy principles has been distorted in both these examples by a small circle of powerful insiders, ideologically supportive of a lightly regulated and increasingly marketised communications environment.

NEW FRAMEWORKS AND NEW SOLUTIONS

In this context – of a loss of trust in the media by European publics, of coverage that is all too easily associated with vested interests, of a growing gap between public and private broadcasters, of worrying levels of concentration of ownership and of a shrinking and defensive public service media sector – I am no longer convinced that our traditional normative attachments in the policy sphere are sufficiently robust to meet the challenges that we face. If the situation has changed, then so should our guiding assumptions and, where necessary, our tools. When facing ultra concentrated markets both online and offline, a commitment to a “plural” media environment is neither sufficiently precise nor sufficiently bold to interrupt existing patterns of control; in an environment in which public service operators are being disciplined and undermined as a result of austerity, an uncritical defence of public service media is unhelpful if they are internalising neoliberal agendas and modes of operation; in a situation in which press freedom is used by billionaire proprietors as a defence against any form of independent regulation, then historic appeals to speech rights and individual liberties will fail to counter the power of corporate giants as they seek to sweep away any attempts to intervene in their markets; and at a time when an increasing number of governments are involved in extensive surveillance of the digital activities of their population, then the mere pursuit of a libertarian conception of ethics will prove useless against this unaccountable mobilisation of state power.
We need instead to adopt fresh policy frames that are more concerned with principles like equality, social justice and above all a redistribution of media resources – just as we need a redistribution of income in order to protect public services and to lift people out of poverty. That does not mean we need to junk everything in our regulatory toolkit but we do need ask tough questions about what will work in an era of concentrated private power. To what extent does industry self-regulation that depends on large organisations monitoring their own behaviour adequately protect the public interest? To what extent can ministerial or parliamentary oversight be relied upon when political and media elites are increasingly intertwined? To what extent can competition law protect public services in such a heavily commercialised political and policymaking environment?
In order to provide some sort of conceptual framework to answer these questions, I think it is not sufficient to turn simply to liberal theories of power and policymaking but to consider more radical alternatives. For example, it may be more productive to learn from media historians like Victor Pickard (2015)_who critiques the role of those ‘nervous liberals’ who use traditional democratic theory – in relation to public spheres and a “marketplace of ideas” – to assess market failure but who then step short of advocating substantive social change. It would also be productive to engage with those social movement theorists who see social change rooted in the possibility of “unconventional collective action” (Mosca 2014, 219) and who, in recent years, have started to engage with questions of media power and counter-power. Joe Karaganis (2009) helpfully distinguishes between two “geographies of activism”: a more civil and polite “consumer-rights-based model of policy advocacy” encapsulated in mainstream media reform strategies and underpinned by “liberal” political values (an approach with which policy academics are traditionally associated), and more militant demands for communicative justice that emerge from “predominantly civil-rights-informed concerns with accountability, representation and voice in the media” (ibid, 4). We can see this latter approach in the campaign activities of the Center for Media Justice (www.centerformediajustice.org) and the work of theorists including Cammaerts, Mattoni and McClurdy (2013), della Porta and Diani (2006), Milan (2013) and Padovani and Calabrese (2014).  
Calabrese himself follows on from Karaganis’ classification and distinguishes between media reform and media justice where the former is intimately tied to “liberal” conceptions of communication rights and where “liberal reforms can be viewed as enabling the persistence of fundamental injustices by failing to address, and even naturalizing, their root causes”’ (Calabrese 2014, 30). This also feeds into Roger Silverstone’s critique of state regulation as being more concerned with procedural questions—about providing enabling structures—than with fundamental questions of justice and the ability to speak freely and respectfully. He argues that “regulation is like grammar. It addresses the rules of language, not how that language is spoken or what it said” (Silverstone 2007, 31).	
For many social movement activists, this type of liberal media reform is seen as potentially counter-productive in that activists are likely to be incorporated into official channels and persuaded to tailor their demands to meet the values and demands of vested interests. De Jong, Shaw and Stammers are right to suggest that social movements are organised along a different and more horizontal logic; they are “non-institutionally oriented and largely anti-institutional” (2005, 32) and therefore likely to doubt the need to engage with formal processes and “official” channels. Thinking in particular of the influential US media reform group Free Press, Mickey Huff of Project Censored warns of the dangers of “working through the system” (Huff 2011) and of attempting merely to fix, rather than to replace, a social system that has been found to be demonstrably unfair and unequal. This lends itself to reformist illusions both that the system can indeed by repaired and that, even if we do fix media institutions, that they will ever deliver social justice within the existing frame of capitalism. As Huff argues, we need to “Be the Media in word and deed…not lobby those in power to reform their own current establishment megaphones for their own power elite agendas, as that will not happen, and indeed, has not, for the most part, in the past” (Huff 2011).	
Huff may be right to emphasise the dangers of working within existing structures and accepting established agendas as the only starting point for political action but there is also a risk in equating “being” the media with “freeing” the media. In particular, the privileging of alternative communication networks and horizontal forms of organisation has led to a failure to confront effectively concentrations of media power with huge symbolic influence and institutional resilience. Todd Wolfson’s study of what he describes as the “Cyber Left” (Wolfson 2014) – networks of individuals involved in Indymedia Centres and the Occupy movement – is particularly instructive. While welcoming their energy and their contribution to cycles of protest, he argues that they were ultimately unsuccessful due to a number of shortcomings: first, a failure to consider capitalism at the systemic level and to raise the salience of class; second, a tendency “to prioritize technology over organizing and social relationships” (ibid, 191); third, an underlying resistance to any form of hierarchy that weakened their capacity for effective action; and finally a failure to involve and mobilise all individuals irrespective of cultural and political capital. 
In order to address some of these tensions between “modest” reform demands and a more deep-rooted programme of transformation and between horizontal and more structured forms of organisation, we can learn from classic debates on the socialist left about strategies for social change. One appropriate place to start might be a pamphlet by the German revolutionary Rosa Luxemburg, Reform or revolution, written back in 1899 in which she distinguished between “revisionist” strategies for reform which attempt to administer palliative care to the capitalist system and more radical strategies that seek to win reforms as a fundamental part of a revolutionary strategy to transform the status quo. While the former wants “to lessen, to attenuate, the capitalist contradictions” (Luxemburg 1989, 45) in order to stabilise society and produce consensus, the latter seeks to struggle for reforms as part of a more widespread challenge to capitalist hegemony. The crucial point for Luxemburg however was that movements for democracy were central to a more profound social struggle: “Between social reforms and revolution there exists for the revolutionary an indissoluble tie. The struggle for reforms is its means; the social revolution, its aim” (ibid, 46). 
Now my point is not that Luxemburg would have spent her time lobbying for better rules for internet governance, more dispersed forms of media ownership or more effective codes of conduct for journalists. I simply want to borrow from her the idea that any “reform” movements (including campaigns against media concentration and those in support of public services) need to confront the structural power of state and market and to engage with a wide range of affected social groups using militant tactics in order precisely to attempt to move beyond existing agendas and normative assumptions. There is a world of difference between an activist campaign which confines itself to parliamentary spaces and calls on a handful of the “great and the good” to plead its case and one which seeks to mobilise greater numbers of people using all the resources at its disposal – a difference perhaps between “reform from above” and “reform from below”. 
Of course, if social movements are to secure durable and significant change, then there is little point in aiming only at amelioration: at applying a band-aid to deep cuts. It is also the case, however, that there is little point in refusing at least to treat the wound if activist movements are to grow and gain influence. We need both to confront and to pose alternatives to the highly unequal power structures that dominate the media but we also need to take seriously all those who want to find solutions to current problems if we are to secure a full mandate for change. A media activism that is based on pressing for policy change in the here and now while simultaneously developing its own structures that go far beyond the constraints of existing media systems may yet bear out John Downing’s prediction that “only dual activity by radical media makers and radical policy activists has the prospect of letting the public construct for themselves any kind of zone worth inhabiting” (Downing 2001, 47).
So as well as looking to new sources of theoretical inspiration, I would suggest that we need to adopt new identities and to see ourselves not simply as “media researchers” or “policy academics” but as activists who are able to embed our scholarly work in wider social movements. It is not sufficient to confine ourselves to academe even if we produce “helpful” information and “persuasive” evidence. Instead, we need to acknowledge Karaganis’ point that “systemic change requires a social movement capable of linking policy agendas with grassroots activism” (Karaganis 2009, 1) and reflect on how best to apply this our own critical work.
	This kind of research activism ought, therefore, to build on a critique of the limitations and democratic insufficiencies of the existing media and allow us to focus on efforts to transform media systems through campaigns to diversify media ownership, democratise the media policy process, introduce new forms of funding for marginalised content, oppose surveillance, challenge existing copyright regimes and press for more ethical forms of journalism. 
If we commit to these objectives, it follows that we should investigate the efficacy of measures such as levies on the profits of the richest companies that can be allocated via independent decisionmaking bodies to new voices or to groups who have previously been unable to secure adequate finance in the media marketplace. We might want to impose additional behavioural obligations on our largest media organisations, such as independent editorial boards to curb the power of proprietors and conscience clauses to protect journalists from unethical demands from their editors. We might even think about how best to institute some sort of democracy in the selection of senior executives. We might also want to investigate ways to deal with the corrupting influence of advertising on editorial content as was demonstrated by Peter Oborne’s resignation as chief political commentator of the Daily Telegraph in protest as the title’s lack of coverage of the HSBC banking scandal (Oborne 2015). These are all acts designed to shift the balance between private power and the public interest—or rather to rebalance media power towards the interests of citizens—and they do seem to be issues that are actually popular with ordinary people. The Media Reform Coalition commissioned YouGov to conduct a poll on precisely these sorts of remedies that found that:

	74 per cent of the UK public believe that in order to own a newspaper, radio station or TV channel, companies should be based in the UK and pay full UK tax.
	61 per cent are in favour of compulsory rules and structures to limit the influence of owners over editorial output.
	71 per cent believe that there should be controls on media ownership including a substantial minority of 41 per cent who think that ownership rules should be strengthened by setting fixed limits on the amount of media any one organisation could own. 
	51 per cent support a levy on the profits of social media and Pay TV companies to fund new providers of local and investigative news with only 9 per cent saying that there were against such an initiative.
	64 per cent would support an inquiry into the relationship between news organisations and advertisers that would also reflect on the implications of the growth of “native advertising” in journalism.
(Media Reform Coalition 2015)

Obviously, such an approach requires an engagement with official structures – with formal legislative processes, with parliaments and policy makers, with lobbyists and lawyers – in order words with the very constituents of the system that many believe are responsible for a diminished and degraded media culture. This involves the kind of participation that we as researchers are used to and sometimes even trained for. But I believe that it also requires connecting with wider social forces campaigning for social justice where the distribution of media resources and the agenda-setting power of media are relevant to the successful outcome of their campaigns. In other words, if we are to fend of the corporate land grab against public service media spaces, then we would be well advised to work with the widest possible constituency of groups who will be affected by attacks on public provision. 
Media policy researchers have a responsibility in this context to amplify these arguments about the flaws of an entrenched media power. We can do more than simply coming up with perfect models of media metrics that demonstrate our knowledge of media enterprises. We can be more productive than simply producing polished submissions to formal consultations where the agenda is set and the decisions taken by others. We can do better than develop normative positions around pluralism and free speech that seem to have little purchase in the outside world nor which challenge the existing distribution of media power. There is no need to confine ourselves to polite requests to tone down the worst excesses of the tabloid press or simply to engage in subdued parliamentary lobbying to secure minimal changes to press self-regulation, although there is no reason why we should stop participating in these activities. Instead, committed media  policy scholars should attempt to broaden the debate and to address the crisis by developing critical accounts of the faults of existing policy approaches while at the same time campaigning for specific remedies (to, for example, digital inequality, media concentration, press scapegoating and the decline of local news). 
We should encourage a diversity of approaches that includes everything from academic research that demonstrates the scale of the problems to street protests (as we have seen in Mexico City, Istanbul and Athens in recent years) that seek to mobilise publics in support of efforts to democratise media systems. At the same time we need to insist that the failures of mainstream media and existing policymaking processes are indeed systemic and not incidental or peripheral to the core operations of media and political elites. We need, in other words, to introduce more radical questions and techniques to those traditionally posed by the majority of traditional policy actors, including academics.

CONCLUSION

At a time of both political and communicative crisis, media policy researchers can learn a lot from Bob Hackett and Bill Carroll’s wonderful book on democratic media activism (Hackett and Carroll 2006) which argues that we need to redefine the very idea of democracy to include new rights such as the right to share meaning as well as an increased emphasis on participation and equality through acts of media-making. The objective for democratic media activists is “to build coalitions and campaigns to engage with and transform the dominant machinery of representation, in both the media and political fields” (ibid, 16). There is little need to separate media activism—both in its policy and more DIY dimensions—from other social struggles. Indeed social justice campaigns will all the stronger given the participation of scholars who are able both to identify the faultlines in our communications systems that have proved to be so disastrous for the exercise of contemporary democracy and to press for alternatives that will radically disrupt the control of media power for too long dominated by vested interests. The scale of the crisis in Europe demands that we rise to this challenge.
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